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IN THE

SUPREME COURT.
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARLENE BURK, a8 Administratix of the
Estate of RICHARD E. ROSER, deceased.
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
CHARLES PETER,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent takes no exception to the statement of
the case presented by appellant in his brief (pp 1-20).
For the sake of brev«rity, therefore, respondent will
avail herself of the appellant's statement of facts, and
will make such comment thereon, coupled with appropriate references to the transcript, as she may deem necessary in the development of hfr argument.

ARGUMENT
Appellant in his brief (pp 20, 21) assigns seven
errors which constitute the basis for his prayer that
this court reverse the judgment of the District Court
in the instant case. Appellant's argument under topic
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(a) entitled ''Defendant's Competency as a Witness
Was Waived by the Administratrix" (pp 22-31) deals
with assignments 5 through 7. The argument under
topic (b) (pp 31-39) entitled "The Plaintiff Failed in
Her Burden of Proof on the Question of Consideration,''
deals with assignment 4. Assignments 1, 2, and 3 are
dealt with generally, if at all, by appellant under both
topics (a) and (b). Accordingly, respondent will divide
this brief in to two topics corresponding to the two topics
set forth by appellant in his brief, and will therein
attempt to answer, under these respeceive topics, all
the assignments of error and arguments made by
appellant.
(a) Defendant's Competency as a Witness was not
Waived by the Administratrix.

The circumstances occurring during the trial which
constitute the basis of the alleged waiver by the administratrix of the so-called "Dead Man's Statute" are not
disputed. Appellant has corectly stated in his brief the
factual basis of this legal controversy in the following
language, (pp 22, 23):
''Miss Burk, the administratrix, testified on direct examination, in support of her case as plaintiff, that the deceased stated he was desperately
in need of money and had written a letter to Mr.
Peter, but hadn't mailed it (Tr. p. 7). The conversation was for the purpose of connecting Ex·
hi bit "C" w·ith the note and the "amount of
payment thereon" (Tr. p. 6). While it was stated
tha~ the letter, Exhibit "C" was not going to be
offered, the plaintiff, nevertheless, and in connec2
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tion 'vith her tesimony, offered the same and it
zvas received in evidence on the question as to
zuhether there had been any payment made on
the nvte (Tr. p. 8. ") (Italics added).

Appellant ~ontends that inasmuch as the administratrix was called upon to testify as to a conversation
which she had had with the decedent relative to the nonpayment of the note, the statutory disqualification imposed upon the defendant was thereby waived by the
} administratrix, and that defendant thereby became com. petent to testify as to other transactions with the
: deceased relative to the execution of the note and the
consideration, if any, which was given therefor. Re1 spondent contends that this conclusion is unsound, and
will, in the arguments appearing under this topic,
attempt to so prove .

.:.

The statute which controls this controversy is set
~ forth as follows.
(Because of its grammatical com: plexity, the writer of this brief has taken the liberty of
c omitting those portions of the statute which he deems are
immaterial to this controversy) :
''The following persons cannot be witnesses :
(3) A party to any civil action, . . . when the
adverse party in such action, . . . sues . . . as
administrator ... of any deceased person, as to
any statment by, or transaction with, such deceased . . . person, or matter of fact whatever,
which must have been equally within the knowledge of both the witness aHd such . . . deceased
person, unless such witness is called to testify
thereto by such adverse party . " 104-49-2, U.
C.A. 1943.
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It will be oberved that the statute provides that the
incompetency of the party sued by the deceased's administrator shall be waived when the administrator
himself calls such adverse party as a witness. It might
be added, parenthetically, that this is not a blanket
waiver, but only a limited one. It permits the witness
to testify in his own behalf only as to those transactions
about which he was interrogated by the administrator,
and to none others. N olty' s Administrator v. Fultz, 261
Ky. 516 (1935); Kraft v. Security State Bank, 54 S.D.
325, 223 N.W. 208 (1929).
The problem involved in the instant case, however,
does not call for an application of the above ''statutory
waiver,'' but rather the recognition of a ''non-statutory
waiver.'' In our situation the adversary to the decedent's estate was never called upon by the administratrix
to testify. Rather, the administratrix herself testified
as to a conversation which she had had with the decedent.
Appellant contends that this testimony constituted a
complete waiver of the statutory disqualification, and
that it should have opened the door to allowing the
defendant to testify concerning all other transactions or
conversations with the decedent having any bea.ring
upon the issues triable under the pleadings. Appellant
argues, in other words, that this court should recognize
and give effect to a ''non-statutory waiver,'' and that
this waiver should be given the broadest possible
application.
Appellant has eorrectly stated that the Utah Supreme Court has never decided whether the so-called
"non-statutory waiver" should be recognized in this ju4
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risdictiou (p ~3). The Honorable James H. Wolfe, in his
article entitled d Competency of Witnesses in Utah to
Testify to Transactions With Deceased, Insane or Incompetent Persons,'' Utah Bar Bulletin, July-August,
1941, Vol. XI, Nos. 7 and 8, Stated on page 80:
"·The competency is avoided when the adverse
party (the one maintaining· the integrity of the
deceased's interests) calls the witness; and the
incompetency may be waived by failing to make
objection to the witness or by objecting to the evidence only. Probably the witness may testify as
to otherwise forbidden subjects when the party
protecting the estate opens up the subject, but
this is undecided. ' '
As appellant pointed out ~n his brief (p 23), the Utah
case of Garner v. Thomas 94 Utah 287, 75 Pac. 2d 168,
{1938) apparently approved this doctrine. Inasmuch
as that portion of the opinion relating to this doctrine
was subsequently deleted, (Garner v. Thomas, 94 Utah
295, 78 Pac. 2d 529), the question still remains one of
first impression.

Respondent does not contend ·in this brief that the
doctrine of the ''non-statutory w·aiver'' should not be
adopted in this jurisdiction. It might he stated in passing that many jurisdictions have refused to adopt it.
Bushee v. Surles, 77 N.C. 62 (1877); Fountain v. Lynrn
57 N .J.L. 503 ; Miller v. Carvnon, 84 Al. 59 ( 1887) ; C ana~
day v. Johnson 40 Iowa 587 ( 1875). On the other hand
many jurisdictions, and perhaps most of them, have
seen fit to adopt this ''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine,
on the grounds that it makes possible a fairer trial.
The following passage is illustrative of this point of
VIew:

5
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"The privilege of objecting to the competency of
the adverse party is also deemd to he waived if
the representative himself testifies or introduce,s
testimony as to the transaction or communication
in question. When the representative has introduced evidence as to transactions between the
deceased and the adverse party, the court has no
discretion in the rna tter to receive or reject the
testimony as it sees fit, but it must receive the
testimony of the adverse party, if it is offered
in such case.'' (Citing cases). Jones Commentaries on Evidenee, 2nd Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 2280,
page 4436.
The postition of the respondent in this brier is that
the ''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine is probably a good
one, but that if it is adopted, it should he adopted with
the same limitations as have qualifiied it in all other
jurisdictions in which the doctrine has been recognized.
It is respondent's contention that wherever this doctrine
has been adoptea the scope of its application has been
limited by allowing the witness to testify only as to
those conversa.tions or transactions with the dece-dent
which are directly related to the tra;nsaotion about w~hich
the administrator has tesbified. In other words, it is
our contention that the waiver must be a qualified and
limited one, and that it must not be made so broad as
to admit any testimony and all testimony relating to the
controversy in issue. Its effect must he that of admitting only such evidence as relates to the issue which
was opened up by the administrator's testimony. This
writer has examined every case cited by appellant in his
brief purporting to adopt the waiver doctrine. In not
6
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one single ease cited did the court extend the benefit of
the ""aiYer as far as appellant would have this court
do in the instant case. Moreover, two of these cases,
Carter -v. Curlew Creamery Co1npany, 134 Pac. 2d 66,
and J.n. Re Fitzpa.trick Estate, 206 N.Y. Supp, 496, made
express mention of the very limitation on the scope of
the waiver 'Y hich ""e are here discussing.
In the instant case 1:Iiss Burk, the administratrix,
testified on direct examination as to a conversation
'vhich she had had with the decedent which related to
the issue of whether the note had been paid by the defendant. Appellant contends that by virtue of Miss
Burk's having so testified, the appellant was therefore
rendered qualified to testify as to all transactions with
the deceased relating to the execution of the note and
the consideration therefor. We contend that if the
''non-statutory waiver'' doctrine should have been applied by the lower court to the foregoing set of facts, then
it should have been applied o~y to the extent of allowing
the defendant to testify as to any transactions which he
had had with the decedent relating to the paymen.t of the
note. But inasmuch as the proffered testimony did not
so relate, we contend that it was properly excluded, even
under the waiver doctrine. We feel that it would be
grossly unjust to allow the waiver, whose benefit defendant seeks, to be extended so far as to strike down
the defendant's disqualification to testify on all issues
in the case involving a transaction with the deceased.
It is quite apparent that the issue of payment and the
issue of consideration are as distinct and separate as
two issues could possibly be in any single trial. The
7
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occurrence of the facts relating to the issue of payment
are separated by many years in time, and by many miles
in distance, from the occurrence of the facts relating
to the issue of consideration.
The doctrine of waiver is essentially an equitable
doctrine and can he employed where such employment
will further justice. In Corpus Juris, Vol. 67, "Waiver"
Sec. 2, we read the following:
"It (waiver) is a doctrine, resting upon an equitable principle, which courts of law will recognize,
that a person, with a full knowledge of the facts
shall not be permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his former position or conduct to
the injury of another; a rule of judicial policy,
the legal outgrowth of judicial abhorrence, so
to speak, of a person's taking inconsistent positions and gaining advantages thereby through
the aid of courts.''
In the instant case this court might well conclude
that inasmuch as the administratrix herself testified as
to a conversation with the decedent relative to the nonpayment of the note, it would be only just and equitable to allow the defendant to give his version of the
facts relating to that single issue, even though to do so
might require his testifying as to a conversation which
he had had with the decedent. In other words, the court
in this situation is confronted with the problem of balancing public policies. On the one hand, it faces that public
policy which closes the mouth of a person to testify as
to transactions had with a deceased person. On the
other hand, the court faces an opposing public policy
which discourages the partial presentation of the facts
8
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of a transaction, and encourages the full presentation
thereof. This principle is well stated in the poetic
words of Alexander Pope:
· •. ..-\. little kno\Yledge is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.
Its shallo"~ draughts intoxicate the brain.
Drinking· largely, so hers us again."
In other words, if the administratrix should desire to
go into the facts of a particular transaction, it is only
just that she should allow her adversary to fill out the
picture by giving· his version of those, and all facts
related to that transaction. However, this reasoning
makes no sense when the adversary attempts to introduce forbidden testimony relating to transactio:Q.s entirely unrelated to the transaction about which the
testatrix testified. How could the application of the
doctrine of waiver perform any equitable function in
this situation~ It must be kept in mind that the recog·nition of this doctrine under any circumstances constitutes an enroachment on the literal interpretation of
the "Dead Man's Statute." It follows that the scope
of the doctrine should be extended cautiously.
As
stated above, respondent has not found one single
case which extends the doctrine of waiver far enough
to give comfort to appellant in his situation. On the
contrary, respondent has found many cases which expressly limit the doctrine in the manner herein contended. This limitation on the waiver doctrine is expressed by Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd Ed.,
Vol. 5, Sec. 2284, page 4448, in the following language:
9
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''The adverse party is competent only as to those
transactions or communications concerning which
testimony has been given, but he may, of course,
go fully into all those transactions. (Citing cases).
The courts of some states hold that if the representative introduces testimony as to any transaction with the deceased or incompetent person,
the adverse party may testify generally and to
any extent. But the general rule is as stated.
The adverse party may not testify as to any
transactions other than those concerning which
the representative has introduced evidence, even
though such testimony as to a separate and independent transaction or communication would
tend to contradict the testimony given as to the
transaction in question. •'
If the above rule be accepted by this court as the
better rule and the one to he adopted in this jurisdiction,
then the only remaining question is whether evidence
relating to the payment or non-payment of the note on
the one hand and evidence relating to the execution and
consideration for the note on the other hand, constitutes evidence relating to the ''same transaction.'' It
is manifestly our contention that these constitute two
different transactions and that the waiver of the administratrix goes to evidence relating to the one transaction
but not to the other. The cases hereinafter discussed
will illustrate what other courts have considered to he
a single transaction or a multiplicity of transactions.
In the case of H a bart v. Verrault, 74 .App. Div. 444,
77 N.Y.S. 483 (1902), the evidence tended to show that
one Zellie Verrault executed a note in favor of N. F.

10
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Ho,ve. ....\fter the maker's death the plaintiff, holder
of the note, sued her administrator for the amount
thereof. The answer to plaintiff's complaint set up,
among other thing·s, the defense of forgery. At the
trial the defendant administrator testified that he was
familiar "'"ith decedent's handwriting, and that the signature on the instrument involved in the suit was It
forgery. Plaintiff thereafter placed the payee of the
note on the stand and had him testify that the signature
on the note was that of the decedent, and that the decedent had properly delivered the instrument to him,
the payee. This testimony was objected to for the
reason that its introduction violated Sec. 829 of the
New York Code of Civil Procedure, which provision
prohibited any party to an action against the estate of
a decedent from being a witness in his own behalf concerning a personal transaction between the witness and
the deceased person. On appeal, the appellate division
of the Supreme Court of New York held so much of the
foregoing testimony as tended to prove the circumstances
under which the note was deli"\Tered to the payee should
have been excluded. Plaintiff's argument that the defendant had waived the protection of the statute by testifying that the purported signatures were forgeries,
was answered by the court with the argument that the
waiver only went to the narrow point at issue which the
defendant was attempting to prove, i.e. forgery, and
not to the issue of delivery of instrument.

Respondent feels that this case is squarely in point.
It will be noted that the broad issue was whether or not
the note was valid. Contained within that larger issue
l!l
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were the two sub-issues as to whether the signature was
a forgery, and whether the instrument had been properly
delivered. The court held in effect that these issues
were so unrelated that the introduction of testimony relating to one of them did not constitute a waiver of the
right to preclude the introduction of testimony relating
to the other. It will be readily seen that this case is
closely analogous to our case in which the broad issue
is whether the note is a valid and subsisting obligation,
and the two sub-issues are whether the note was issued
for a consideration, and whether the note had been paid.
The only point in which this case differs from our
case is that the New York statute governing this case,
eontrary to the corresponding~ Utah statute, had a
specific provision to the effect that the introduction
of testimony by the administrator concerning a particular transaction constituted a waiver by him of the
disqualification of the adverse party to testify as to
that transaction, ''Revised Statutes, Codes and General
Laws of New York" 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, "Evidence" Sec.
3, Page 1261. In other words, the New York statute
apparently codified the so-called "non-statutory waiver"
discussed in this brief. It would appear, however, that
this distinction clearly makes ours an .a fortiori case,
inasmuch as a court would be less likely to extend the
scope of a non-statutory waiver, whose very recognition
is at variance with the literal provisions of the statute,
than it would be to extend the scope of a waiver specifically created by statute. The case of Clift v. Moses,
112 N.Y. 426, 20 N.E. 392 (1889) is another New York
case illustrating the tendency of the court to limit the
scope of a waiver.
12
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. .\ppellant, in his brief, cited the case of Carter v.
Curle~Creantery CoJnpauy, sttpr(~. This case is not in
point, since it inYolves an application of the ''statutory
"~aiver'' provided by that section of the statutes of the
State of ''Tashington comparable to our own Sec. 10449-2. See Rem. Rev. Statutes (Washington) Sec. 1211.
In other 'Yords, this case involves a situation in which
the party "·hose interests were adverse to those of the
estate, 'vas called to testify by the administratrix as to
a transaction with the deceased. However, even though
the case is not strictly in point, it is worth considering
for a moment in this brief, because it gives splendid
discussion of the 'Yisdom of limiting the scope of the
"statutory waiver." We submit that the reasons which
impelled the Washington court to limit the scope of the
''statutory "~aiver,'' are equally impelling, if not more
so, to limit the scope of the non-statutory waiver in the
instant case.
In the Carter case, one Ira Carter instituted an
action against the defendant business firm, to vacate
its prior corporate dissolution and to require an accounting. During this action the plaintiff died and his wife,
as executrix, was substituted in his stead. One of the
issues at the trial was whether the decedent, a former
officer of the corporation, had been properly notified
of the directo:ri meeting at which the resolution to dissolve the corporation had been passed. Another issue
was whether at the time of such meeting the decedent
was still an officer of the corporation.. During the
trial a witness whose interests were adverse to those
of the estate (and who was therefore disqualified under

13
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Washington statute), and who had been secretary of
the corporation at the time of the aforesaid meeting,
was called by the executrix and asked, ''Is this (referring
to t:ije minute book) the one plac.e that you find your
father voted his (the decedent's) stock~'' Answer: ''My
father has always voted Carter's stock, and Mr. Carter
has never objected.'' This question was apparently
asked in an attempt to show that the decedent had not
been notified of the meeting. Subsequently, this same
witness was put on the stand by the defendants and
was asked ''Whether she had ever heard the decedent
say to its employees, in her presence, that he had no
interest in the corporation.'' This question, which was
properly objected to, wa.s asked in order to show that
the deeedent disclaimed any interest in the corporation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the question asked. by the defendant with regard to
whether the decedent had claimed any interest in the
corporation was improper. The court recognized the
statutory waiver, but held that it could not be extended
to admit evidence as to all issues in controversy, but·
only to the narrow issue about which the witness for
the executrix was initially called upon to testify. In
that connection, the court made the following statement:
"It may be conceded that appellant did introduce
certain testimony relative to transactions and
conversations with the deceased, and as to those
transactions first developed by appellant, the
benefit of the statute was waived, and respondents had the right to introduce evidence relative
to those transactions and all other circumstance8 ,
necessary to explain them. But although the

14
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statute 1n ay ha ce been 1caived as to those particltlar transacf.ivn.s upeued up by appella.nt, the
lcai·rer does uot e~.rteud to unrelated transactions
aud coucersatiou.s. Kraft v. Security State Bank,
- i s D
·)·).'T TIT ·)o8 ~ w·1k·
J-:~:
• • t:>
..... J. ·)·)·)
---0 l.\. " ' . ....
1 1n::s:-; v. s1{Og1una,
1~7 ~eb. 38~)~ :236 N.,v~. 31; Nolty's Adm'r v. Fultz,
:2Gl Ky. 516, 88 S.W. 2d 35.'' (Italics added) .

. .\.ppellant in his brief attempts to cast disrepute on
the Dead :Jlan 's Statute by quoting from Wigmore. In
response to this irrelevant attack, the following answers
are made: (a) The Dead :Nlan 's Statute serves a wise
and beneficial purpose. (See one of the most recent
treatments of this statute by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of JJ axfi eld v. Sainsbury ____________ Utah ____________ ,
172 Pac. :2d 122 (1946) wherein the court gives a sympathetic discussion of the general aims and purposes
thereof) ; (b) this statute, and other statutes having
similar import, are in· force in almost every state in
this country; (c) this statute is now, and has been the
law in Utah (having undergone some changes) since
at least the year 1876 (See Compiled Laws of Utah 1876,
Title XI, Sec. 377; and (d) this statute is not on trial
in this case, and therefore all references to its merit
are irrelevant.
(b) The Plaintiff Sustained Her Burden of Proof
on the Question of Consideration.

The District Court found that the note in question
was ''executed and delivered to said Richard E. Roser
for a valuable consideration, and that there was no want
or lack of consideration, for the execution thereof" (Tr.
p 010, Finding No. 5). Based upon this finding, the

15
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court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant the amount of the note, plus
fees and costs (Tr. p 010), and rendered judgment to
that effect.
To this finding, and the judgment rendered thereon,
the defendant excepted, for the reason that the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff was not sufficient to support a
finding that the note in question was supported by good·
consideration.
It is submitted that the record is replete with substantial, competent evidence, sufficient in law to support
the court's finding that the note in question was supported by good consideration.
Before discussing this point, let it be remembered
that the duty of the Supreme Court in this appeal is not
to review the evidence as though this were a trial de
novo, and to match its judgment as to the probative
value of the evidence introduced at the trial below,
against that of the trial judge. Probably no principle
of law relating to appellate practice has received more
frequent enunciation by this and other courts than that
expressed in the case of Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah
1, 33 Pac. 2d 401 (1934), wherein this court said, on
page 408:
''In an action at law a finding of the trial court
usually is approved if there is sufficient competent · evidenc.e to support it, though the evidence with respect thereto may be in conflict
and the finding apparently against a preponderance or the greater weight of the evidence.''
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Surely no one at this late date questious the validity
of this just principle. Accordingly, appellant, in order
to convince this court that the finding- of the trial
court relatiYe to consideration must be reversed, must
show that there is no substantial evidence in the record
tending to sho'v the existence of such consideration.
It is respectfully submitted that there is not only
substantial evidence tending to support the finding
of consideration, but that such evidence preponderates
over all conflicting evidence.
The following evidence, as shown by the record,
is respectfully called to the attention of this court as
tending to show the presence of consideration :
a) The note, by using the words ''for value re-

ceived,'' indicates on its very face that it W'a.S given
by the defendant to plaifntiff 's decedent for good and
valuable consideration. Appellant in his brief attempts
to prove to this court that the statutory presumption
of consideration (Sec. 61-1-25, U. C. A. 1943) which
attaches to every negotiable instrument is not considered
to be evidence having any probative value, but is to be
considered only as a point of departure, indicating upon
whom rests the burden of going forward with the evidence. Respodent finds no fault with the statement of
the rule as set forth by appellant. There is one fact
which appellant bas completely overlooked, however,
and that is~tt! words "for value received''' are entitled
to definite probative value in and of themselves, W
apart from the statutory presumption of consideration
with which the note as a whole is clothed. It is well
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settled that the words "for valuable consideration," or
their equivalent, appearing in the body of a note, have
the force of an admission by the maker of the presence
of consideration.
Thus, in the case of Owens v. Blackburn, 146 N.Y.
S. 966 (1914), the New York court said, on p. 967:
''The note not being·· payable to bearer or order
. is non-negotiable, * * * and there would therefore
be no presumption of consideration; but the
recital "value received," in the body of the note,
constitutes an admission that the instrument was
issu.ed for a suffi'Cien.t con.sider.ation." (Italics
added).
Likewise, in the case of Hance Hardw·are v. Howard,
8 A. 2d 30, ( 1939), the court said:
''There is a double presumption of a valuable
consideration attached to the present note. ( 1)
It is a negotia.ble instrument. * * * ( 2) The note
sued upon, over the signature of the defendant,
includes the words 'value received' * * * The
presence of the words, however, has always been
a prima facie acknowledgment or admission by
the makers of the receipt of a sufficient consideration. Palmer v. Blanchard, 113 Me. 380,
94 A. 220; Ow·ens v. Blackburn, 161 App. Div.
827, 146 N.Y.S. 966; Du Bosque v. Munroe, 168
App. Div. 821, 154 N.Y.S. 462; Hamilton v. Ham·
ilton., 127 App. Div. 871, 112 NY.S. 10. ''
It is respondent's position, therefore, that the
presenc.e of the words ''for value received'' on the face
of the note, are equivalent to an admission by the maker
of the note that the latter was issued for valuable con-
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sideration. ...\dmittedly, it is not conclusive. Like any
other admission, it ean be explained, or even denied.
But, standing by itself, it is certainly entitled to the
dignity of being considered substantial evidence.
b) The entire circuntstances connected with the
tnakiHg of the note indicate that it w·as supported by
valid consideratio~n. Consider the note itself: It was
for a large sum of money. It is inconceivable that the
maker, a man experienced in business practices, would
transfer to another man his negotiable promissory note
unless he intended to be bound thereby. A $5,000.00
negotiable promissory note is not a play thing. Defendant certainly must have known this. Defendant certainly knew that in the hands of a bona fide purchaser,
all personal defenses on the instrument would be cut off.
If defendant did execute the note without consideration,
intending it as a joke, or perhaps as an ac.c.ommodation
to the decedent, to bolster his credit rating, it is certainly logical to believe that he would have made some
effort to retrieve it after its purp·ose had been fulfilled,
rather than leaving it in the payee's hands for five and
one-half years. Moreover, the note provides for reasonable attorney's fees in the event that it should not be
paid, and the holder should have to sue. This is certainly not the language of a man who does not intend
to pay, but rather that of a man who does intend to
make every effort to discharge an honest obligation.
c) The correspondence between the parties subsequent to the execution of the note, and the statements
and transactions by the decedent, reveal unmistakeably
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that both parties con.sidered the note to be a valid and
subsisting obligation, upon which full payment w·as expected. The letter marked Exhibit "C ", written
by the decedent to the defendant shortly before the
former's death, states, in part:
"Karl, what have I done that I deserve such neglect. I could he discharged at once for three
days of creeping and two weeks on crutches
would do the trick. But I cannot leave with an
unpaid hoard bill. I just wonder now how this
matter is coming out. In ten years you have not
been able to plank down even 15% of the amount
you owe me and that Canadian affair is just
another fa ta morgana. ''
This letter shows that just prior to his death, the
decedent felt that the defendant was indebted to him
for a substantial amount of money which had not been
paid. On page 11 of the transcript we read where Miss
Burk, on cross examination, stated, with reference
to the aforesaid letter: "He (decedent) told me he had
written Mr. Peter for some money that was owing him."
Later, both Mrs. and Mr. Morgan testified to the
effect tha.t the decedent had desired to buy a part of
Mr. Morgan's business, but that he had finally decided
that h~ could not make it for the reason that the defendant refused to pay him some money which he owed
him. In one place, the testimony indicated that this
indebtedness arose out of a note for approximately
$5,000.00, which is the amount of the note in controversy
in this action.
The following
transcript:

excerpts

are

taken

from
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the

Q. · ~. N O\\T, did you have any other conversation
'vith ~Ir. Rth;er concerning· this nob.', or indebtedness
owing· by nlr. Peter to nlr. Roser ol''
A.

(.~Irs.

l\Iogan)

H

Yes, sir."

Q. d\Vill you state "There, and

when~"

A. "'\\Tell, ~Ir. Morgan 'Yas figuring on selling his
business and ~Ir. Roser was thinking of buying.''

Q. ''And that was about three years before he
died!"
A. Yes sir."
Q. ''State what was said.''
A. ''He said 'He would like to buy the business,
because he had controlled it so long, and knew everything about it, but I haven't the money. Mr. Peter
owes me a note, but I cannot get the money." (Tr. pp
21, 22, 23).

Q. "You say that Mr. Roser told you he couldn't
buy your husband's business because Mr. Peter owed
him some money that hadn't been paid, is that right~''
A. (Mrs. ~forgan) "Yes sir."
Q.

"Just what was his

attitude~"

A. ''He wanted the business very much. He liked
it. He enjoyed it, and he wanted to buy when he found
Mr. Morgan wanted to sell.''
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''The only thing that prevented him was the
fact Mr. Peter had not paid him what he owed him~"
Q.

A.

"Well that is what he told us."

(Tr. p 28).

A. (Mr. Morgan) "Mr. Roser, when he was at the
home, said 'That he would like to purchase the business.'
Tha.t is the time that I thought I would like to get rid
of part of my business, and he expressed himself as
being desirous of purchasing it, and he said 'He had a
note of approximately five thousand due from Mr.
Peter, and if he could collect on that he could probably
swing the deal.'' (Tr. p 31).

A. (Mr. Morgan) "Oh, he expressed himself as
being interested several times, but this is where it came
to, or was really brought out to a head, that he expressed himself as being very desirous of purchasing
1"t . "

Q. ''And at all times it was stated the reason he
could not purchase the property was because Mr. Peter
owed him money that he had not paid~''
A.

''He had to raise money.''

Q.

"Did he say Mr. Peter owed him money'"

A.

"That is right."

(Tr. 35 ).

"But you want the court to understand that
the rea.son he didn't buy your business was because
he couldn't make his collection from Mr. Peter~"
Q.
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A.

"That 'vas a great factor in it." (Tr. 37).

In the letter from defendant to decedent, marked
Exhibit ~ ~ 0 ", a11d dated ~{ay 17, 194:±, the defendant
implies that he o'ves decedent a large sum of money,
because he says: ''I have never let anyone down, intentionally, and I never shall do so, however at the
moment I could not square a $25.00 debt. * * * ''
This series of letters, statements and transcripts
reveals but one thing·: that between July 26, 1940, and
the date upon which decedent died, the decedent entertained the definite impression that the defendant owed
him a substantial amount of money. This amount was
at least large enough to help decedent buy a portion of
a prosperous business. On one occasion, decedent even
\vent as far as to state that the debt was for approximately $5000.00. In our opinion, this positive evidence
has great probative value in proving the presence of
consideration.

In the trial of this case, defendant did not adduce
one bit of direct or convincing evidence tending to prove
that there was no consideration in support of the note.
Yet the law is clear that to overcome the presumption
of consideration which attaches to every valid negotiable instrument, (and a fortiori to one which recites a
valid consideration on its face) the proof must he clear
and conviP~ing, Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Washington 451,
93 P. 2d 709. Defendant's evidence is only of such
character as tends to lead to conclusions by negative
inference. Thus defendant argues that since there was
no reference to the note in decedent's personal effects,
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it must be concluded that decedent did not consider it
to be a thing of value. On the contrary, there is every
evidence that 'the decedent did consider it to he a thing
of value. Consider the fact that he had carefully preserved the note itself among his business files. (Tr. 33).
In fact, it might be argued that the very fact that the
decedent preserved the note for five and one-half years
indicates that he must have ascribed some value to
it. Otherwise, he would have destroyed it.
Appellant then argues that sinc.e there is no evidence that decedent made demand for payment after
the maturity of the note, notwithstanding the fact that
payment was demanded on other accounts, this indicates
that decedent did not consider that there was any
amount owing. Appellant's premises however, are equivo.cal. Respondent's testimony quoted above shows
clearly that the indebtedness was never out of the
decedent' mind. His last letter (Exhibit "0"), which.
decedent wrote so close to his death that it was never
sent, was the plea of a dying man for the defendant to
pay off this long standing obligation. The absence of
any single document specifically making demand for
payment of the note, is explainable by the fact that
the defendant and the decedent were close friends and
frequently associated with each other. It is quite probable that decedent made specific. oral demand for payment of the note during one of his many visits with the
defendant.
The other arguments of the defendant are of a
similar vein. They are all based on equivocal inferences.
We feel tha.t it is unnecessary to devote further space
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to demonstrating the \Yeakness of appellant's evidence,
since the la\\'" does not impose such duty upon us. Our
responsibility is only to sho\Y that the record contains
some substantial evidence ,v·hich can sustain the judgment of the District Court. This, "\Ve feel, has already
been done.
CONCLUSION

In summary·, respondent contends that the District
Court did not err in excluding· defendant's proffered
testimony relating to transactions between the defendant and the deceased relative to the execution and the
consideration given for the note in question. Respondent further contends that the substantive evidence introduced during the trial by the plaintiff was sufficient
in every respect to support a finding by the District
Court to the effect that the promissory note was valid
and subsisting· in every respect. Accordingly, it is
contended that the judgment appealed from should be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
JosEPH E. EvANs
and Respondent
Attorney for Plaintiff
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